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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for injuries to property arising
:rom an obstruction in the City's sewer line which caused
the sewer to back up repeatedly into Plaintiff's home.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A Default Judgment was entered against the Defendant.
The Defendant subsequently filed a Motion To Set Aside the

Judgment, an Affidavit, and a Memorandum of Authorities.

The

district court, after hearing oral argument by both parties,
fonied the Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have the District Court's Order
dismissing Defendant's Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment
3ffirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
NEGOTIATION BACKGROUND

As mentioned on pages 7 and 8 of the transcript of the
hearing, there were negotiations before the suit was filed.
0 ::!ore detailed account of the negotiations shows the
':llowing:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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h~

On March 30, 1976, the Plaintiff first contacted

attorney concerning the damage done to her home by sewage
backflow.

More accurate information was requested, re sear~:.

was done, and on May 28, 1976, the Tooele City Council and
Mayor Douglas Sagers were informed by written statement of::
claim asserted by the Plaintiff.

This two-page letter out·

lined the dates when the sewer had backflowed into the Defe:.·
dant 's home.

The backflows had actually started in January,

1975, and the final backflow occurred on December 26, 1975.
The letter also itemized the Plaintiff's claim for damages. '
A copy of this letter was also mailed to the Defendant's
attorney.
In correspondence dated August 13, 1977, from the Gul'.,
Insurance Company, a claim adjuster requested information a:·:j

I

Plaintiff's claim.

On August 27,

I
1976, the information re· I

quested was supplied to the Gulf Insurance Company Group-·
including copies of cancelled checks issued by the Plainti:::
I

to pay repairmen, etc.

··I

On October 6, 1976, Plaintiff's

attorney contacted by letter the Gulf Insurance Group reque: ..
a progress report.

A copy of this letter was sent to the

I

Defendant's attorney.
On the 12th of OCtober, 1976, Plaintiff's attorney.,,,
informed by the adjuster for the Gulf Insurance Company

t~:·

1

1

the reason for the delay was that they had not received s: . < i
information from the Defendant.

Dl , ...

On October 14, 1976, · ---
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attorney was informed that the Gulf Insurance Company was
referring this matter to the Commercial Standard Insurance
c:or;ipany of Fort Worth because the responsibilities for coverage should be vested in them.

On October 14, 1976, notice

of the Plaintiff's claim was sent to Crawford

&

Company,

me new adjuster, along with copies of the information previously sent to the other adjuster.

A copy of this letter

was sent to Defendant's attorney.
On the 20th of October, 1976, the new adjuster asked
for additional information, which was sent to them by letter
dated October 21, 1976.

On October 29, 1976, Crawford

&

Cor;ipany said by a letter that the responsibilities for the
coverage, if any, belonged with Gulf Insurance Company.
On November 11, 1976, ·Plaintiff's attorney notified
Gulf Insurance Company of the decision of Crawford

&

Company.

It was noted that if some response was not received by
~ovember

22, 1976, that legal action would have to be insti-

tuted against the City of Tooele.

A copy of this letter was

:nailed to the Defendant's attorney.
On November 18, 1976, Gulf Insurance informed Plaintiff's
attorney that they were denying the Plaintiff's claim for
.lamages.

After the refusal to pay the claim, the lawsuit was

~lied and the Mayor was served personally on January 24,

1977.

ADDITIONAL FACTUAL INFORHATION
The Plaintiff did inform the City of Tooele, on or about
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the 3rd day of June, 1975, about the sewer back-up.

In the

process the Plaintiff contacted personally Douglas Sagers,
the Mayor; Dale Howard, the City Engineer; Keith Dymock, t;,,
Sewer Plant Superintendent; and Stephen Hilton, the Tooele
County Sanitation Officer, telling each about the back-up;
however, the Plaintiff never used the words
At all times she referred to the
tiff's Complaint, paragraph 9].

11

11

sewer line 11

sewer lateral''.
•

[See Plain-

Plaintiff agrees that the

City couldn't find the Defendant's sewer line.
The Plaintiff then hired her own contractor, who fina:.
found the obstruction and the cause of the obstruction, a
broken section of sewer pipe.

The broken pipe was located

approximately 125 feet along the sewer line from Plaintiff':

i

basement sewer drain in the street belonging to the Defenda::
named Isgreen Circle, and not the Plaintiff's property, as
stated in Defendant's Brief.
The Plaintiff's attorney, after obtaining a Default
Judgment on the 17th of February, 1977, gave notice to cefe:·
dant on the 24th of February, 1977, by written letter that
a Default Judgment had been obtained and requested payment.
The February 24, 19 77, letter was delivered to the Defenda:: ,
attorney on March 4, 1977.

[See paragraph 8 of Defendant':

Affidavit].
The Plaintiff's attorney's last correspondence '"'' ·

!

I

-- Defendant's insurance carrier was the November 18, l 9 1 11 - I
I
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in

which the carrier denied liability.

After denial, Plain-

tiff had no further obligation to correspond with Defendant's

insurance carrier--to do otherwise would be a violation of
ethics.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE GRANT THE DISTRICT
COURT DISCRETION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENTS.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 55(c) and
60 (b), grant discretion to the trial court to set aside a

Default Judgment for a number of different reasons which are
specifically itemized.

In order to vacate a Judgment the

:noving party must designate the exact rule upon which the
r~ief

is granted.

The Defendant's Brief is silent as to

which specific rule provides a basis on which the Judgment
should be set aside.
This Court, in 1973, in the case of Airkem Interm::>untain,
Inc. v. Parker,

30 U2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, held in affirming

the decision to not set aside a default judgment that the
general rule is that the decision as to whether or not the
)efendant had an opportunity to present his case is to be
~.ade

at the trial level, and that the Supreme Court won't

reverse just because the Defendant's Motion To Set Aside
:ould have been granted.
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POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETIONARY DECISION SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED UNLESS IT WAS SHOWN TO BE AN ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS DISREGARD OF DISCRETION.
In the case of Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 29 C2ci.
508 P. 2d 528

(1973), this Court held that on appellate reL:

the trial judge should be affirmed unless the dee is ion is
arbitrary and capricious to the point reflecting a clear
of discretion.

ab~:

The Defendant has not cited in his Brief a:. •

action of the District Court which was arbitrary or capric::_
The cases cited by Defendant are well-known to the Distric:
Court.

They were mentioned in Defendant's Memorandum of

Authorities prior to the hearing on the Motion.

These case;

were also argued before the Court and still the Court refos1
1

in its discretion to grant the relief requested by the De'.e:·

1

dant.
More recently this Court again subscribed to this vie·
in the case of Pacer Sport

&

Cycle,

Inc. v. Meyers, 534

P.::'
I

616, Utah (1975), as the Court said:
"The trial court has a discretion in determining
whether or not a default judgment should be set
aside, and we on appeal should not reverse its
ruling except for abuse of discretion, to wit,
that it is arbitrary, capricious, or not based
on adequate findings of fact or on the law."
This Court al so held, in Masters v. Leseuer, 13 U2d 293,
P.2d 573

(1962),

..

that relief from a Default Judgment on Jr:

of inadvertence and excusable neglect is discretionary a::
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i:1

the clear absence of a clear abuse of discretion, the

trial court will not be reversed.
Thus, the Defendant has the burden to prove that there
was a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion as it made
i11dgments as to whether the Defendant has met the burden re-

quired by Rule 60 (b) or 55, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

POINT THREE
A REVIEW OF THE CASE LAW AND THE FACTS SHOW
THAT THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION.
The Defendant, in its Brief and in its Memorandum of
Authorities, has cited a number of cases dealing with Default
Judgments.

There are an equal number in which Judgments have

been set aside and in which the Judgments have been affirmed.

Corruron themes present in all cases are the questions of due
diligence and control.

The Defendants have had to consis-

tently show that they have acted with due diligence, Warren v.

Dixon Ranch Co.,
case, supra.

260 P.2d 741

(1953) Utah, and the Airkem

In the Warren case the Defendants were required

to show that they acted in due diligence in order to obtain
:avorable treatment.
In the present case, the Defendant's attorney said in
his Affidavit,

paragraph 8, that he was unaware of the judg-

:tent until informed by the Mayor, who showed him the letter
sent to the Mayor by the Plaintiff's attorney.

It is clear
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that after he became aware of the Judgment he exercised d1.;"
diligence, but before the Plaintiff informed the Mayor,
neither the Defendant nor the Defendant's attorney had dor.e
anything to check on the progress of the lawsuit.

In the

5,.

paragraph the Defendant's attorney stated:
"Because your affiant was not personally required
to prepare an answer in the matter, and due to
his heavy involvement in other city and private
cases, he did not pursue the preparation of an
answer further •.. "
When the Defendant presented the Summons and Complaint to
its attorney, he was aware of the nature of the lawsuit anc
knew that the Defendant must answer the Complaint within
20 days or a Default Judgment would be taken.

To simply

assume that somebody else, even an insurance attorney, wocl:
answer for the Defendant does not show due diligence on the
part of the Defendant or its attorney.
Another essential element that basically the courts
I

decide in these cases is the element of control.

I

If the

Defendant has no control over the events because of lack:'. /
I

I

notice or for some other reason, the court then properly
liberally interprets the rule and often grants an Order
ting aside the judgment.

Montez v. Tonkawa Village

::::1

A~,

215 Kan. 59, 523 P. 2d 351 (1974); Mogui Inc. v. Ambrose_3:;::
Rosenfield And Co.,

21 Ariz. App. 565, 521 P.2d 1143 (19i~

Phillips v. Findly, 19 Ariz. App. 348, 507 P.2d 687 (197:
Kennedy v. Meyer Co.,

Inc., 218 Kan. 387, 543 P.2d 937 1::

Utah State Employees Credit Union v. Riding,

24 U2d 21L
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?.2d 1 (1970); and Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 U2d
]2, 376 P.2d 951

(1962).

In the cases where Default Judgments have been affirmed,
the Defendants had notice and, essentially, the control of their

reasons for defaulting was placed squarely on the Defendants:
~'

supra.; Airkem, supra.; Warren, Masters, supra.; and

Boise Valley Traction Co. v. Boise City, 214 P 1037, Idaho
(1923); Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700

(1974); and American

savings And Loan Association v. Pierce, 28 U2d 76, 498 P.2d
648 (197 2).

In the present case the elements of control are as
follows:
on

~~y

The City and its attorney are n·otified of a claim

28, 1976.

The Defendant's attorney is given copies

of Plaintiff's correspondence with insurance companies on
october 6, October 14, and November 11 of 1976, plus Defendant's attorney had his own private communication with Defendant's insurance adjusters.

On January 24, 1977, the

Defendant is served when the Hayor is personally served with
a copy of the SUI!lIIDns and Complaint.

The Defendant immediately

delivers the same to its attorney, who gives directions to
his secretary to take care of the Complaint.

Neither the

~fendant nor its attorney take further action to actually

notify their insurance adjuster, to request an extension of
time, or to prepare an answer.

All such courses of action

which would have been proper are solely under the control of
:~

Defendant and its attorney.
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Thus, because the Defendant had control and did not
exercise due diligence under the Utah case law, it was not
an abuse of the court's discretion to refuse to set aside
the Default Judgment.

POINT FOUR
MISPLACING THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANT'S
ATTORNEY'S EMPLOYEE AFTER BOTH DEFENDANT AND
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY HAD SEEN COMPLAINT IS NOT
INADVERTENCE OR EXCUSABLE NEGLECT.
In an Idaho case that is directly in point with the
present case, Boise Valley Tractor Co. v. Boise City,
1037

214:

(1923), the Court ruled that the confusion of papers o:

the mistake and inadvertence of a clerk in placing the SUl!Ul[·
and Complaint in a file where the Mayor did not see them
would not constitute such a mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect, as contemplated by the statute in
order to obtain relief from judgment.
The facts in Boise showed that the Mayor had been
served personally, that the Complaint was filed in a Public
Utilities Commission file with the name of the same compar.;·.
and that the error was not discovered until the Plaintiff
made demand for payment.

These facts are the same, but 1 ~

the present case, the Mayor gave the documents to the Cit;·
Attorney, who gave them to his secretary, who then filed:'·
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complaint and Swnmons with the rest of the investigative
material already compiled for this case by the Defendant's
attorney, paragraph 7 of Defendant's Affidavit.
This Court has also ruled in Masters, supra., that ordinary memory lapse accompanied and facilitated by a clerical
error in filing papers plus additional items was not excusable neglect.

In the Pacer case, this Court al so held that

inaction or failure to take action on the part of the Defendant does not rise to the level of excusable neglect.

The

failure of a secretary to timely mail an Amended Complaint also
did not rise to the level of

excusable neglect, Doyle v. Rice

Ranch Company, 81 P.2d 980 (California, 1938).
It is a general rule of law, as cited in 49 CJS

§

334,

paragraph N6(a), that the law does not look with favor, however,
in setting aside defaults resulting from inexcusable neglect,
inadvertence, suprise, or neglect of attorneys in the performance of their duties to their clients.

Such failure on the

part of the attorney ordinarily is imputable to their client,
unless their default can be excused as being the result of
accident or suprise, that which ordinary prudence on their
Fi!rt could have been avoided.
The real neglect or advertence in the present case
occurred in the Defendant's attorney' s off ice; however, this
<n1stake should not be excusable.

The next neglect was on

':'le part of the Mayor, who was by the Plaintiff notified about
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the problem in 1975, who received notice of Plaintiff's ckin May, 1976, who was served personally on January 24, 197',
and who turned the Complaint over to his attorney soon the,,af ter, and then took no further action until informed by
Plaintiff's attorney about the Judgment.

As Mayor and Chie:

Executive Officer of Tooele, the Mayor has a supervisionary
role of all City employees, including the City Attorney and
his secretary.

Thus, the failure to properly file by both

the Defendant and its attorney is submitted as not rising
to the level of excusable neglect.

POINT FIVE
EQUITY DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT A DEFAULT JUDGMENT
BE SET ASIDE UNLESS OTHER FACTORS ARE PRESENT.
The Defendant has relied on equity to set aside the
Default Judgment in both its Brief and Memorandum.
review of the case law, however,

A close

indicates that additional

1

I

factors have always been present when the Court has set as;:, i
a judgment for equitable purposes:

J

In the Warren case, sU,.-1,

the need for equity and to avoid harsh treatment were nece:·
sary; however, the Defendant must show

due diligence befC:'

I

being able to obtain the more favorable equitable treatme;,:. Ii
The Court in the case said:
"Although a judgment may be erroneous and inequitable, equitable relief will not be granted
to a party thereto on the sole ground that the
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negligence of the attorney, agent, or trustee
or other representative of the present complainant prevented a fair trial."
Sufficient evidence was available at the hearing for
the lower court to be fully advised as to the Defendant's
alleged inequities that should have compelled the Court to
grant relief, and yet the Court was not impressed that any
alleged inequities should have been remedied by setting
aside the judgment.

POINT SIX
EQUITY REQUIRES THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED
TO THE RELIEF PROVIDED IN THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
Since 1898, the legislature has authorized cities to
oonstruct and operate sewer· systems, U.C.A. 10-8-38, 1953
as amended, and also given cities the authority to tax to
pay for the operation of such systems, u.c.A. 10-7-14(2).

Further, the legislature has authorized cities to bond for
treatment of the sewer and to even tax to retire the bonded
indebtedness, u.c.A. 10-7-7, 8,

&

9.

Thus, the responsibility

for the operation of a sewer has been vested by the legislature with the city rather than with the citizens of the city
as a matter of public policy.
Before statehood in 1892, the Utah Supreme Court held,
~the

case of Kiesel & Co. v. Ogden City, 30 P 758, where
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sewers have been solely controlled by municipalities,

tha~

the city is liable for the direct inundations of property··:
sewage where the sewer is negligently maintained by the Ci:
In the Cobia v. Roy City case,

366 P.2d 986,

(Utah, 1961),

the Court held that the operation of a sewer system was a
goverrunental function.

The Plaintiff has complied with the

Utah Intergovernmental Immunity Act, so that the issues of
negligence can properly be raised.

I

The break occurred 125 feet from the Plaintiff's base·
men t drain, the sewer line went from the Plaintiff's house

I

directly on to the neighbors' property, and then angled frc:

I

the neighbors ' property to a bigger sewer 1 ine on Is green
Circle.

The break in the pipe occurred in the City street.

[See paragraphs 10 and 11 of Plaintiff's Complaint].

The

Plaintiff had no idea where the sewer line was, and this
should have been known by the City.
The City was collecting a service fee from Plaintiff
for the collection of sewage.

The City, therefore, had a

duty to insure that the Plaintiff would not be damaged fro:
sewage back flow.

I

Since the break occurred in the City st:;·!

there was no way for the Plaintiff to have control over t:;'
sewer line.

The City had the capacity to control and the

responsibility to maintain its sewage system in such a rna::.;::
so that the Plaintiff would not be damaged by sewage back:
Since the damage occurred, and the Plaintiff had no contr:.
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Jver the circumstances which caused the pipe under the road
to break, equity demands that the Plaintiff have a Judgment
::or the damages.

CONCLUSION
The decision to grant relief is vested to the trial
court.

It is discretionary and should be affirmed unless

1t is an arbitrary and capricious disregard of this discretion.

Adequate information was available to the Court

prior to reaching its decision.

In light of the case law and

the facts of this present case, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by refusing to vacate Plaintiff's Judgment.
The neglect and inadvertence of this case does not rise to
the level of excusable neglect.

Equity does not require a

Judgment be set aside just because the Order could have been
granted.

For these reasons, the Order of the District Court

should be approved.

Respectfully submitted,

FRE W. FIN INSON
Attorney for Plaintiff & Respondent
7 21 Kearra Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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